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Asset prices and the equity premium might reflect doubts and pessimism. Introducing these features
in an otherwise standard New-Keynesian model changes in a quite substantial way the nature of the
policy that maximizes the welfare of the consumers in the model. First, following productivity shocks,
optimal policy in this model is more accommodating than in a standard New-Keynesian model, and
may even inflate the equity premium. Second, asset-price movements improve the inflation-output
trade-off so that average output can rise without increasing much average inflation. Finally, a strict
inflation-targeting policy may result in lower average welfare than a more flexible inflation-targeting
policy, which instead increases the comovements between inflation, asset prices and output growth.
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The theme of monetary policy and asset prices has been widely debated in the literature,
especially after the recent ﬁnancial crisis. Several authors have argued that monetary
policy in the last decade was too expansionary when compared to the previous twenty
years, and that a policy more aggressive toward inﬂation would have been beneﬁcial to
avoid the spur of the asset price bubble.1
In this paper, we revisit the theme of monetary policy and asset prices in a standard
New-Keynesian monetary model. An important shortcoming of current models is to have
counterfactual implications for the equity premium and other ﬁnancial relationships. We
address this issue by introducing distortions in agents’ beliefs— doubts and ambiguity
aversion— which enable the model to reproduce realistic values for the equity premium
and the market price of risk.2 The policy conclusions of the benchmark model change in a
substantial and interesting way. In the benchmark model, the welfare-maximizing policy
following a productivity shock involves keeping prices stable. Moreover, average output
cannot rise because it is too costly to increase average inﬂation.3 In our framework, the
welfare-maximizing policy is more accommodating and involves an increase in inﬂation
following positive productivity shocks. The inﬂation-output trade-oﬀ becomes less severe,
because of the interaction between asset prices and ﬁrms’ price-setting behavior. The
equity premium is higher under optimal policy than under a price-stability policy because
equity returns are more procyclical.
Indeed, average output can rise without much increase in average inﬂation if the ﬁrms’
discounted value of current and future costs does not move much. This can happen, in
our model, if marginal costs are negatively related to the ﬁrms’ evaluation of future
payoﬀs through the stochastic discount factor. In fact, the impact of an increase in
marginal cost on the price setting decision can be at least partially oﬀset by a decrease
in the stochastic discount factor associated with that contingency. In our framework,
doubts and ambiguity aversion distort the stochastic discount factor creating an inverse
relationship with long-run productivity — the more the higher the degree of ambiguity. An
expansionary monetary policy leads to procyclical marginal costs and therefore can create
a negative comovement between the stochastic discount factor and marginal cost. A more
1See for instance the discussions of Poole (2007) and Taylor (2007); see section 5 in Greenspan (2010).
See also The Economist May 18th 2010.
2Doubts and aversion to ambiguity are introduced using the framework of Hansen and Sargent (2005,
2007). See Barillas et al. (2009) for the ability of this framework to reproduce realistic values for the
equity premium and the price of risk.
3For an overview of the main results of the literature see Benigno and Woodford (2005), Khan et al.
(2003) and the recent review of Woodford (2009b).
1expansionary policy is optimal in our model because it can correct for the ineﬃciencies
due to monopolistic competition by raising average output while keeping average inﬂation
low, thanks to the ﬂattening of the trade-oﬀ between average inﬂation and average output.
In fact, in the standard New-Keynesian monetary model, this trade-oﬀ is too step leaving
no room for improving average output.
We further show that an interest rate rule calibrated to match monetary policy under
Greenspan’s tenure as a chairman of the Federal Reserve achieves equilibrium allocations
that resemble the ones prescribed by optimal policy in our framework. In addition, we
show that Greenspan’s policy is closer to optimal policy in our model than the traditional
Taylor rule. In fact, in our model, exploiting the less severe output-inﬂation trade-oﬀ
requires a relatively more procyclical policy. However, we also ﬁnd that the estimated
Greenspan’s policy is too accommodative even from the perspective of our model.
The closest paper to our work is Karantounias (2009) which analyzes a Ramsey prob-
lem but in the optimal taxation literature where, like in our model, the private sector
distrusts the probability distribution of the model while the government fully trusts it.
Beside the diﬀerent focus of the two economic applications, the other subtle diﬀerence is
in the approximation method. Whereas Karantounias (2009) approximates around the
stochastic no-distrust case for small deviations of the parameter identifying the dimension
of the set of nearby model, we approximate around a deterministic steady state allowing
for even large deviations of the same parameter while bounding the maximum amplitude
of the shocks.
Woodford (2009a) studies an optimal monetary policy problem in which the monetary
policymaker trusts its own model but not its knowledge of the private agents’ beliefs. In
our context, it is just the private sector which has doubts on the true model whereas the
policymaker is fully knowledgeable also with respect to the doubts of the private sector.
Moreover, Woodford (2009a) uses a New-Keynesian model where distorted beliefs are
introduced in an already approximated linear-quadratic environment with the consequence
that his model cannot be considered as an approximation to a general equilibrium model of
optimal monetary policy under distorted beliefs.4 Both issues explain why in his context,
in contrast to our results, the optimal stabilization policy following productivity shocks is
to keep prices stable no matter what is the degree of distrust that the agents might have.
Dupor (2005) analyzes optimal monetary policy in a New-Keynesian model in which only
the investment decisions are distorted by an ad hoc irrational expectational shocks. In our
4Indeed, in his framework distorted beliefs should not appear in a ﬁrst-order approximation of the
AS equation—as it is instead assumed. Moreover, beliefs will aﬀect second-order terms and therefore the
construction of the micro-founded quadratic loss function unless the approximation is taken around a
non-distorted steady state.
2framework, the distortions in the beliefs are instead the result of the aversion to model
mis-speciﬁcation on the side of households, which also aﬀe c t si na ni m p o r t a n tw a yt h e
intertemporal pricing decisions of the ﬁrms on top of the investment decisions.
There are several other papers that have formulated optimal monetary policy in ad hoc
linear-quadratic framework where the other main diﬀerence with respect to our work is
that the monetary policymaker distrusts the true probability distribution and the private-
sector expectations are aligned with that distrust.5 We, instead, take a pure normative
perspective from the point of view of a fully knowledgeable policymaker who knows the
true probability distribution and understands that the private sector distrusts it.
Another related strand of literature is that on the interaction between monetary policy
rules and asset prices. Bernanke and Gertler (2001) have studied whether monetary policy
should react to asset prices in order to stabilize ﬂuctuations driven both by fundamental or
speculative reasons. A distinctive feature of their model is the role of ﬁrms’ balance sheets
in the transmission mechanism of asset-price movements to the aggregate variables. They
show that price stability is optimal in response to both productivity and non-fundamental
shocks. An interest-rate rule aggressive with respect to inﬂation can approximate well
the optimal policy. Instead, Cecchetti et al. (2000) ﬁnds that conditional on the non-
fundamental shock, the interest rate rule should also react to asset prices. Within the class
of ﬂexible-inﬂation targeting rules, we ﬁnd that the optimal simple rule should move from
as t r i c ti n ﬂation-targeting policy, when there are no doubts, to a more ﬂexible inﬂation
targeting policy, which also includes output growth and asset-price inﬂation, when doubts
rise. However, similar to Bernanke and Gertler (2001), we ﬁnd that including asset-price
inﬂation as target does not improve much average welfare.
The structure of the paper is the following. Section 2 discusses model uncertainty.
Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 characterizes the optimal policy. Section 5
studies the implementation of the optimal policy through interest-rate rules. Section 6
presents some special cases.
2 Model Uncertainty
We characterize model uncertainty as an environment in which agents are endowed with
some probability distribution —the “reference” probability distribution— but they are not
sure that it is in fact the true data-generating one, and might instead act using a nearby
distorted “subjective” probability distribution.
5See the papers cited in Ellison and Sargent (2009) and among others Dennis et al. (2009), Giannoni
(2002), Leitemo and Soderstrom (2008), Rudebusch (2001).
3Consider a generic state of nature st at time t and deﬁne st as the history st ≡
[st,s t−1,...,s0].L e tπ(st) be the “approximating” or “reference” probability measure on
histories st, that the agents are endowed with. Decision-makers may seek a diﬀerent
probability measure, a “subjective” one, denoted by ˜ π(st) which is absolutely continuous
with respect to the “approximating” measure. Absolute continuity is obtained by using
the Radon-Nykodym derivative, which converts the reference measure into the subjective
one.6 First, the two probability measures agree on which events have zero probability.



















t) ≡ E(GtXt) (2)
in which we have deﬁned E(·) and ˜ E(·) the expectation operators under the “reference”
and “subjective” probability measures, respectively. Speciﬁcally, G(st) is a probability
measure, equivalent to the ratio ˜ π(st)/π(st), that allows a change of measure from the
“reference” to the “subjective” measure.
Moreover, the martingale-assumption on Gt implies
E(Gt+1Xt)=E(GtXt).






with the property Etgt+1 =1 . It follows that g(st+1|st) is equivalent to the likelihood ratio
˜ π(st+1|st)/π(st+1|st), and acts as a change of measure in conditional probabilities. High
values of g(st+1|st) imply that the decision-makers assign a higher subjective probability
to state st+1 conditional on history st.
For each random variable Xt+1, the martingale increment gt+1 deﬁnes a mapping
6This way of constructing subjective probability measures is borrowed from Hansen and Sargent (2005,
2007).
4between the conditional expectations under the two measures:
˜ Et(Xt+1)=Et(gt+1Xt+1), (3)
in which Et(·) and ˜ Et(·) denote the conditional-expectation operators.
As in Hansen and Sargent (2005), we use conditional relative entropy as a measure of
the divergence between the “reference” and “subjective” probabilities,
Et(gt+1 lngt+1),
which approximately measures the variance of the distortions in the beliefs. When there
are in fact no distortions this measure is zero: in this case, indeed, g(st+1|st)=1for each
st+1. In particular, since we are going to work with a dynamic model, in what follows,
it is more appropriate to exploit the discounted version of conditional relative entropy









where 0 < β < 1. A high value of entropy can be interpreted as a very large divergence
between the “subjective” and the “reference” beliefs. On the contrary a low value of
entropy implies beliefs that are not too distorted or diﬀerent from the reference model.
3M o d e l
3.1 Households
We consider a closed-economy model with a continuum of ﬁrms and households. House-
holds have doubts about the true probability distribution. As discussed in the previous
section, we assume that households are endowed with a “reference” probability distribu-
tion but act using a distorted nearby subjective probability distribution. Therefore, the












with Gt0 =1and where β is the intertemporal discount factor, with 0 < β < 1; Ct is a









where θ, with θ > 0, is the elasticity of substitution across the consumption goods and
ct(j) is the consumption of the individual good j; Lt is leisure.
Households are subject to a ﬂow budget constraint of the form
WtNt + P
k
t Kt + xt−1 (Qt + Dt)=xtQt + Pt(Ct + It)+Tt, (6)
where Wt denotes the nominal wage received in a common labor market; Nt is labor
(notice that Nt + Lt =1 ) ; Pk
t represents the nominal rental rate of capital, Kt, which
i sr e n t e di nac o m m o nm a r k e tt oa l lﬁrms operating in the economy; xt is a vector of
ﬁnancial assets held at time t, Qt the vector of prices while Dt the vector of dividends; Pt








where Pt(j) is the price of the individual good j. Finally Tt represents government’s
lump-sum taxes, and It the real resource needed, in terms of units of the consumption
good, to increase the household’s holdings of capital stock. Given Kt and It,n e x t - p e r i o d
capital stock follows from
Kt+1 =
µ





Kt + It, (7)
where δ, with 0 < δ < 1, represents the depreciation rate and φ(·) is a convex function of
the investment-to-capital ratio. The convexity of the adjustment-cost function captures
the idea that is less costly to change the capital stock slowly. It implies that the value
of installed capital in terms of consumption varies over the business cycle, therefore the
model implies a non-trivial dynamic for the Tobin’s q.
6Households maximize expected utility (5) by choosing the sequences of consumption,
capital, leisure and portfolio holdings under the ﬂow budget constraint (6), the law of
accumulation of capital (7) and an appropriate transversality condition. Standard op-
timality conditions imply the equalization of the marginal rate of substitution between







The ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to asset holdings imply the standard orthogonality




























t+1} =1 . (11)
Moreover, by deﬁning with mt,t+1 the real stochastic discount factor as mt,t+1 = Mt,t+1Pt+1/Pt,













The optimality condition with respect to capital can be also written in terms of an









































Tobin’s q measures the consumption cost of a marginal unit of capital and is increasing
with the investment-to-capital ratio. The return on capital, described in (13), is given by
two components: the ﬁrst one captures the return on renting capital to ﬁrms in the next
period, while the second component captures the beneﬁts of additional units of capital in
building up capital stocks for the future rental markets.
3.2 Distorted beliefs
Households doubt the reference probability distribution and surround it with a set of
nearby distorted beliefs. In this set, they choose the worst-case probability distribution
to guide their choices. Following the robust-control literature of Hansen and Sargent
(2005), the worst-case distribution is chosen by the decision-maker in the same way as if
there is an “evil” agent which seeks to minimize the utility of the decision-maker under
the entropy constraint (4). The latter deﬁnes the size of the set of alternative models, and
imposes a bound on the allowed divergence between the distorted and the approximating


















and the restrictions given by the martingale assumption on Gt:
Gt+1 = gt+1Gt (15)
Etgt+1 =1 . (16)
The parameter Φ in the entropy constraint imposes an upper-bound on the divergence
between the distorted and the “reference” beliefs. The higher Φ, the more afraid of mis-
speciﬁcation the agent is, because a higher Φ allows the “evil” agent to choose larger
8distortions.
Hansen and Sargent (2005) propose an alternative formulation of this problem in which

















where κ > 0 is a penalty parameter on discounted entropy.
The problem of the “evil” agent, therefore, becomes that of choosing the path {gt}
to minimize (17) under the constraints (15) and (16). Higher values of κ imply less fear
of model mis-speciﬁcation, because the “evil” agent is penalized more by raising entropy
when it minimizes the utility of the decision-maker. When κ goes to inﬁnity, the optimal
choice of the “evil” agent is to set gt+1 =1at all times, meaning that the optimal
distortion is zero: the rational-expectation equilibrium is nested as a special case.
We assume that the utility function is log in both arguments and given by U(Ct,L t)=
lnCt + ηlnLt where η is a parameter such that η > 0. As discussed in the literature,
among others by Barillas et al (2009) and Karantounias (2009), the solution of the above
minimization problem implies a transformation of the original utility function (17) into a












showing that ψ ≥ 1. In particular, ψ =1corresponds to the case of no model uncertainty.7
A further implication of the above minimization problem is that the martingale incre-







7This risk-adjusted utility function coincides with that of the preferences described in Kreps and
Porteus (1978) and Epstein and Zin (1989). In that context, ψ represents the risk-aversion coeﬃcient,
while in our framework ψ is a measure of the degree of ambiguity aversion. As it will be clear in the next
sections, the two environments imply a completely diﬀerent characterization of the optimal policy.
93.3 Firms
There is a continuum of ﬁrms of measure one producing the respective consumption goods








for each generic ﬁrm j where At represents a common labor-productivity shifter and α,
with 0 < α < 1, is the capital share. Given the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator, a generic ﬁrm j







where total output, Yt, is equal to consumption and investment
Yt = Ct + It.( 2 1 )
Households own ﬁrms which distribute proﬁts in the forms of dividends. Given (11), the
value of a generic ﬁrm j is given by
Q
j





where nominal dividends are deﬁned as
D
j

























where Mt,t =1 .
We assume that ﬁrms choose prices, capital and labor to maximize the ﬁrm’s value
cum current dividend. In particular, cost minimization under the production function































We assume that ﬁrms are subject to price rigidities as in the Calvo’s mechanism. In
particular, at each point in time, ﬁrms face a constant probability (1−γ), with 0 < γ < 1,
of adjusting their price which is independent of the last time prices were re-set. Firms
that can adjust their price set them by maximizing the present-discounted value of the
ﬁrm cum current dividend considering that prices set at time t will last until a future



























Notice that ﬁrms’s pricing decisions, for their forward-looking nature, are inﬂuenced by the
distorted beliefs through the distorted expectation operator. The optimal price decision,
P∗








where Zt is given by the following expression

















in which we have deﬁn e dt h em a r k - u pa sμ ≡ θ/(1 − θ).
Moreover Ft, in equation (26), is given by the following expression








Finally, a further implication of the Calvo’s mechanism is the following law of motion for
the aggregate price level as a function of the past aggregate price level and the optimal
11price P∗
t chosen by the ﬁrms that can reset their price
P
1−θ

















in which the gross inﬂation rates is given by πt = Pt/Pt−1.
3.4 Equilibrium
In equilibrium aggregate output is used for consumption and investment as in (21). Fin-
ancial market equilibrium requires that households hold all the outstanding equity shares
and that all the other assets are in zero net supply.






































which follows the law of motion
∆t = γπ
θ









Finally, lump-sum taxes are adjusted to balance revenues and costs for the government
in each period.
Given the processes for the stochastic disturbances {At}, initial conditions (∆t0−1,
12Kt0−1) and a monetary policy rule, an equilibrium is an allocation of quantities and prices
{Ct, Yt. Kt, Nt, It, Ft, Zt, Pt, Pk
t , Wt, qt, ∆t, gt, Vt} such that equations (7), (8), (12),
(14), (18), (19), (21), (24), (27), (28), (29), (30), (31) hold, considering the deﬁnitions
of the following variables Mt,t+1, Rk
t, Lt, w h i c ha r eg i v e ni nt h et e x t ,a n dc o n s i d e r i n g
that the distorted expectation operator is related to the reference expectation operator
through (3).
4 Optimal policy
In this section, we address the analysis of optimal policy from a normative perspective.
Indeed, the optimality criterion is taken from the view of a policymaker who understands
that the “reference” model is the true model and trusts it. The policymaker can recognize
the distortions in the beliefs of the private sector through the Arrow-Debreu prices and
manipulate them in order to achieve a higher welfare. Interestingly, even a knowledgeable
and “intelligent” policymaker, who is sure about the reference probability distribution,
might not necessarily desire to reduce the doubts of the private sector and instead might
exploit them, and perhaps amplify them, in order to correct other distortions.






where expectations are taken under the non-distorted probability distribution. In par-
ticular, we are interested in characterizing the optimal policy under commitment. The
policymaker seeks to maximize (32) by choosing the sequences {Ct, Yt. Kt, Nt, It, Ft, Zt,
Pt, Pk
t , Wt, qt, ∆t, gt, Vt} under the constraints (7), (8), (12), (14), (18), (19), (21), (24),
(27), (28), (29), (30), (31) given the processes for the stochastic disturbance {At} and
initial conditions (∆t0−1, Kt0−1), considering the deﬁnitions of the variables Mt,t+1 and Rk
t
in (10) and (13), given the relationship between leisure and labor Lt =1− Nt and con-
sidering that the distorted expectation operator is related to the “reference” expectation
operator through (3).8 This Ramsey optimal policy problem is clearly time-inconsistent
8Notice that even though the households’ and ﬁrms’ reaction functions are equivalent to those that
can be obtained by assuming that the preferences of the households are of the Epstein-Zin-Kreps-Porteus
form, the optimal policy problem is not equivalent to an optimal policy problem in which preferences
of households are of the Epstein-Zin-Kreps-Porteus form. Indeed, in the latter case, the objective of a
Ramsey policymaker would coincide with the preference of the households and therefore with the Epstein-
Zin-Kreps-Porteus preferences and not with (32). See Levin et al. (2008) for an analysis of optimal policy
with Epstein-Zin-Kreps-Porteus preferences.
13because of the presence of forward-looking constraints (12), (18), (27), (28), therefore it
cannot be written in a recursive form. This is not really an issue if we could solve the op-
timization problem in a non-linear way. Instead we proceed with approximation methods
which apply to stationary optimization problems. To this end, we analyze a commitment
from a timeless perspective where additional constraints are added at time t0.T h e s e
commitments on the variables Ft0, Zt0,V t0 and Ht0 ≡ Mt0−1,t0Rk
t0 are of the same forms
as the future constraints to which the Ramsey policymaker is already committing to and
are such to allow the problem to be written in a recursive way, as discussed among others
by Benigno and Woodford (2007).
O u rs o l u t i o nm e t h o di st oc o n s i d e rt h eﬁrst-order conditions of the optimal policy
problem under this stronger form of commitment. First, we compute the optimal policy in
absence of uncertainty and in particular under no model uncertainty. In this deterministic
steady state, the optimal policy implies zero inﬂation, which is a result in line with other
analyses of optimal monetary policy under timeless perspective, discussed in Benigno
and Woodford (2005). Our framework generalizes those results to a model with capital
accumulation. As a second step, we take a ﬁrst-order approximation of the non-linear
stochastic ﬁrst-order conditions of the optimal policy problem (discussed above) around
the deterministic steady state by considering small perturbations of the shocks around
their deterministic path. We solve the resulting system of linear stochastic diﬀerence
equations using standard methods in order to characterize the optimal policy for the
endogenous variables as a linear function of the state variables.
We calibrate the structural parameters of the model consistently with existing results
in the macroeconomic literature. In particular, following Christiano, Eichenbaum and
Evans (2005), we set α =0 .36 which corresponds to a steady state share of capital
income equal to roughly 36 percent. We set δ =0 .025, which implies a rate of capital
depreciation equal to 10 percent at annual rates. This value of δ is roughly equal to
the estimates reported in Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992). In addition, we set the
coeﬃcient determining demand elasticity with respect to prices, θ, equal to 6, implying a
steady state price mark-up of 20 percent.9 We choose η =0 .45 to match a steady state
Frisch elasticity of labor supply of 1.8, as estimated by Smets and Wouters (2007) on U.S.
data. We set γ =0 .6 to match the frequency of price adjustment estimated by Klenow
and Kryvtsov (2008) and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005). The discount factor
is set equal to β =0 .99, implying an average real interest rate of about one percent at
values of ψ consistent with observed equity premium.10 Following Jermann (1998), we
9Similar values are obtained in Smets and Wouters (2007).
10These values are computed under the assumption that monetary policy follows a Taylor rule, rep-
14set the second-derivative of the adjustment-cost function φ(·) evaluated at the steady
s t a t ei ns u c haw a yt h a t1/¯ φ
00 =0 .25, which corresponds to the steady-state elasticity
of the investment-to-capital ratio with respect to Tobin’s q. We assume the following
random-walk process for productivity
log(At+1)=ζ +l o g ( At)+εt+1,
where εt+1 has zero mean and standard deviation σ, and ζ is a drift in technology. We
assume σ =0 .012 and ζ =0 .004 to match respectively the volatility and the mean of U.S.
quarterly total factor productivity estimated by Fernald (2008). The model is consistent
with a balanced-growth path and therefore we can obtain a stationary representation by
re-scaling the appropriate variables through the level of productivity. We study optimal
policy for diﬀerent values of the parameter ψ ∈ {1,25,50,100,150}.11 In particular, ψ =1
represents the benchmark model of rational expectations, while ψ =1 5 0i st h ed e g r e eo f
model uncertainty at which our model matches the average U.S. equity premium of 5.5%
per year, as estimated by Fama and French (2002).12
We study optimal policy under diﬀerent degrees of model uncertainty, which corres-
ponds to diﬀerent values of the parameter ψ. In particular, Figures 1 and 2 show the
impulse responses of selected variables to a unitary shock to technology.
The case ψ =1corresponds to the benchmark model of rational expectations. As
it is well known, price stability, and therefore the ﬂexible-price allocation, is the optimal
policy.13 Consumption and output steadily increase towards their new higher steady-state
levels. The real and nominal interest rates rise on impact and decline steadily to sustain
the increase over time in consumption. The return on capital and the Tobin’s q increase
on impact and therefore investment.
resentative of actual U.S. policy: it = ρiit−1 +( 1− ρi)[φππt + φxxt], where xt is the output gap. All
variables are expressed in log-deviations from the steady state, and parameters are set to standard levels:
ρi =0 .8, φπ =1 .5 and φx =0 .5.
11A value of ψ equal to 150 is not necessarily too high or too low value as explained in Barillas et
al. (2009), unless is related to the detection error probability. The detection error probability represents
a weighed probability that a likelihood-ratio test between the “reference” and the “distorted” model
will select the wrong model. Low values corresponds to alternative models that are “easy to detect”.
Barillas et al. (2006) consider that detection error probabilities around 0.1 still correspond to alternative
models which are “diﬃcult to detect”. In our case the detection error probability associated with the
“reference” and the “distorted” models is 0.45 when ψ = 150 and the monetary policy follows the Taylor
rule. Therefore, we are conﬁdent that at this value of ψ t h et w om o d e l sa r ed i ﬃcult to distinguish and
therefore doubts remain.
12The 5.5% equity premium is obtained under a standard Taylor-rule which requires the nominal
interest rate to evolve according it = ρiit−1 +( 1− ρi)[φππt + φxxt], where xt is the (log) output-gap
and πt inﬂation. Parameters are set to standard levels: ρi =0 .8, φπ =1 .5 and φx =0 .5.
13See Woodford (2009b) for a discussion of optimal policy in this case.
15With model uncertainty and under optimal policy, the impulse responses change quite
substantially and the more the higher the degree of model uncertainty. The optimal policy
becomes very accommodative. Inﬂation increases on impact and steadily declines toward
zero. The increase is higher the higher is the degree of model uncertainty. Nominal interest
rates become more volatile: ﬁrst, they decrease and afterward they rise. In the short run,
the real rate now falls; consumption and output increase on impact even to overshoot
their long-run levels. The Tobin’s q jumps at higher levels leading to a larger change in
investment. As ψ increases, optimal policy becomes more and more accommodative to
the technology shock. Moreover, the higher ψ is, the higher is the volatility of the return
on equity and capital and the price of equity and capital. For instance, after a 1% increase
in total factor productivity, equity return and Tobin’s q increase on impact by 0.6% and
0.12 %, respectively, if ψ =1 , while they jump to 1.05% and 0.6% if ψ =1 5 0 .
To sum up, optimal policy implies a more pro-cyclical response of inﬂation which “over
- accommodates” the technology shock. Such an increase in inﬂation is accompanied
by an increase in the volatility of quantity variables, such as output, investment and
consumption, as well as in the volatility of asset prices, as the Tobin’s q, equity and
capital returns, nominal and real rates. The larger the degree of distortion in beliefs, the
larger the departure of optimal policy from price stability.
4.1 Why does model uncertainty matter for optimal policy?
Why is it optimal to “over-accommodate” the technology shock? The benchmark model
with no model uncertainty features two distortions: on the one side sticky and staggered
prices and on the other side the monopolistic competition in the goods market. In par-
ticular, the frictions in the price adjustment can produce real losses because inﬂation
generates price dispersion and therefore an ineﬃcient allocation of resources among goods
that are produced according to the same technology. This can be seen by inspecting
equations (30) and (31): everything else being equal, higher inﬂa t i o nr e q u i r e sm o r el a b o r
to produce the same amount of output. In our model, to counteract this distortion, the
policymaker should reduce the variability of prices and at the best stabilize the price level.
On the other side, the presence of a monopolistic-competitive goods market produces an
ineﬃcient wedge between the marginal rate of transformation and the marginal rate of
substitution between consumption and labor, leading to a too-high price mark-up and a
too-low level of production. In our model, to counteract this distortion, the policymaker
should increase average inﬂation and therefore create some price dispersion in order to
lower the average markup. However, at the margin, the costs of creating some price dis-
16persion overwhelm the beneﬁts in terms of a reduction in the average mark-up. As it is
well known in the literature (see Khan et al., 2003, Woodford, 2009b), in this benchmark
case, price stability turns out to be the optimal policy maximizing the welfare of the
consumers in the model.
Our framework adds two additional distortions to the benchmark model which both
depend on the distorted beliefs originating from the doubts that the private sector has
regarding the “reference” probability distribution. In particular, households, who fear
model mis-speciﬁcation, attach higher probability to the states of nature in which there
are bad news regarding the long-run productivity level. To see this, we take a ﬁrst-order
approximation of equations (18) and (19) obtaining
lngt+1 = −(ψ − 1)(1 − β)
hP∞
j=0 β




j(Et+1 ln ˆ Lt+j+1 − Et ln ˆ Lt+j+1)
i ,
where hats denote deviations of the variable with respect to the steady state. It is shown
that the distortion in the beliefs gt+1 depends on the revision in the expected path of
consumption and labor eﬀort. However, when β is close to 1 the above expression can be
approximated by
lngt+1 ' −(ψ − 1)[(Et+1 ˆ C∞ − Et ˆ C∞)+η(Et+1ˆ L∞ − Etˆ L∞)]
and therefore by the revisions in the expectations of long-run consumption and labor.
Since the long-run level of labor does not vary following a permanent productivity shock,
ah i g hl e v e lo fgt+1 mainly reﬂects bad news with respect to long-run consumption and
therefore bad-news with respect to productivity. The policymaker has almost negligible
impact on these distorted beliefs since it is optimal to keep long-run inﬂa t i o nt oz e r oa n d ,
therefore, not to aﬀect long-run consumption.
However, there is still room for the policymaker to exploit the doubts of the private
sector in order to improve the welfare. First, everything else being equal, distorted beliefs
cause an ineﬃcient accumulation of capital. To this end, consider the arbitrage conditions
pricing the real return on capital, rk









By taking a second-order approximation of the above conditions we derive the excess








Va r tˆ r
K
t+1 = −covt(ˆ mt,t+1, ˆ r
K
t+1) − covt(gt+1, ˆ r
K
t+1).
The distortions in the beliefs add an additional term to the premium on the capital return
w h i c hn o wd e p e n d so nt h ec o v a r i a n c eb e t w e e nt h er e t u r no nc a p i t a la n dt h ed i s t o r t i o n si n
the beliefs gt+1. This additional term leads to an ineﬃcient accumulation of capital, under
a policy of price stability. Indeed, in this case, the return on capital is positively correlated
with the current and long-run level of technology and therefore negatively correlated with
gt+1. The premium on the return on capital becomes larger. Although monetary policy
has no leverage in inﬂuencing gt+1, it can instead correct the distortions in the capital
accumulation by acting on the return ˆ rK
t+1. In our model, the policymaker should in fact
aim at making the return on capital less cyclical thereby reducing the premium on capital
and increasing the average level of capital.
The second dimension along which distorted beliefs aﬀect the equilibrium allocation is
related to the pricing decisions of ﬁrms. To get the intuition, let us consider the aggregate-
supply equation under the assumption that the cost of adjusting capital is inﬁnite and
steady-state investment is equal to zero, Yt = Ct. Under this assumption and log utility,





























where mc denotes the real marginal costs.










where Zt is given by (33). The above equation makes clear that there exists a positive
relationship between inﬂation and the present discounted value of the real marginal costs.
In the benchmark model with no model uncertainty, the second term on the right-hand
side of (33) is not present. Given the monopolistic-competition distortion, output and
18the average real marginal costs are too low. The policymaker can increase the average
real marginal costs, reduce the average mark-up by raising average inﬂation. This is
too costly, as we have already discussed. Under model uncertainty, the decision maker
can instead raise real marginal costs without increasing much average inﬂation provided
real marginal costs covary negatively with Gt and therefore with gt. In fact, by mak-
ing the stochastic discount factor negatively related with the future real marginal costs,
the present discounted value of the ﬁrms’ costs does not rise much even when average
marginal costs increase. Therefore ﬁrms do not have much incentive to increase their
prices. It is important to notice that the distortion in the beliefs now interacts with the
monopolistic-competition distortion and the decision maker can exploit this interaction
by increasing the procyclicality of real marginal costs following a productivity shock. This
more procyclical response increases the variability of output and of real marginal cost,
making the covariance between the latter and the discount factor more negative.
To sum up, the two dimensions along which distorted beliefs aﬀect allocations, i.e. the
capital accumulation decision and the price setting decision have opposite implications
for optimal policy. The former calls for a less procyclical policy, while the latter calls for
a more procyclical policy. It turns out that the latter dimension always dominates for
all parameter values because reducing the ineﬃciencies due to monopolistic competition
is of ﬁrst order importance in this class of models. In general in New Keynesian models
the trade-oﬀ between inﬂation and output is too steep to correct for the distortions due
to monopolistic competition. In our model, the comovement between asset prices and
marginal cost reduces the severity of this trade-oﬀ. Indeed, as it is shown in Figure 1,
under the optimal policy real marginal costs become strongly procyclical and the more
the higher is the degree of distortions in the beliefs. The return on capital and on equity
become also more pro-cyclical and volatile worsening the equity and capital premia.
4.1.1 Welfare and degree of distortion in beliefs
Table 1 reports the unconditional expectations of several variables in comparison with
the steady state, computed through a second order linear expansion of the ﬁrst order
conditions around the non-stochastic steady state, for diﬀerent values of ψ, and evalu-
ated at optimal policy. As it shown in the Table, following the reduction in the average
mark-up, the average investment increases together with average consumption and out-
put as ψ increases, despite the ineﬃcient capital accumulation due to higher distorted
beliefs. Moreover, the reduction in the average mark-up and the increase in the average
output come with negligible costs in term of average inﬂation. Indeed average inﬂation is
approximately zero at all values of ψ. Therefore, the higher the distortion in beliefs, the
19s.s ψ =1 ψ =2 5 ψ =5 0 ψ =1 0 0 ψ =1 5 0
Welfare 0.043 0.044 0.055 0.066 0.091 0.120
Output 2.009 2.010 2.053 2.103 2.218 2.350
Consumption 1.580 1.581 1.602 1.627 1.688 1.764
Investment 0.429 0.429 0.451 0.476 0.531 0.592
Hours 0.601 0.601 0.603 0.608 0.619 0.638
Inﬂation* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Real Marginal Cost 0.833 0.833 0.834 0.839 0.857 0.888
Premium on Capital* 0.000 0.005 0.320 0.910 2.894 5.963
Equity Premium* 0.000 0.017 0.820 1.830 4.402 7.711
Table 1: Means of selected variables; s.s.= steady state, *= in % and at annual rates,
**= in %.
higher welfare, as the monetary authority is able to reduce more the ineﬃciencies due to
monopolistic competition.
We are also interested in understanding the implications of the model for the price








which implies using (22) that
Qt = ˜ Et{Mt,t+1(Dt+1 + Qt+1)}
where aggregate dividends simplify to
Dt+1 = PtYt − MCt · Yt

















t ≡ Qt/Pt and we have used the non-distorted expectation operator. Moreover,
to get further insights, we assume that the cost of adjusting capital is inﬁnite and that
steady-state investment is equal to zero. In this case, under the preference speciﬁcation















which implies that the mean of aggregate consumption is a good proxy for the average
stock-market value in real terms. To see this, notice that under optimal policy the terms
in the curly bracket does not move much (unconditionally) since it is strictly related to
Zt and to the inﬂation rate. Indeed, as it is shown in Figure 1, the impulse response
of equity behaves similar to that of consumption. Table 1 shows that, as ψ increases,
the equity premium increases under optimal policy, while in the benchmark model with
rational expectations it is unrealistically small.
4.2 How does Greenspan’s policy compare to optimal policy in
our model?
In this section we evaluate Greenspan’s policy from the perspective of our benchmark
model. We model Greenspan’s policy through an interest rate rule,
Rt = r + ρrRt−1 +( 1− ρr)(φππt + φxxt)+ut, (34)
on the sample period corresponding to Greenspan as chairman of the Federal Reserve,
1987:3-2006:1, where Rt is the quarterly average Federal Funds rate, πt is the quarterly
inﬂation rate, xt is a measure of output gap obtained by hp-ﬁltering real GDP and r is
deﬁned as r ≡ exp(ζ)/β.14 We obtain ρr =0 .9, φπ =0 .99 and φx =0 .75. We then solve
our model under the estimated policy rule (34) at a degree of model uncertainty ψ =1 5 0 ,
where Rt corresponds to the quarterly risk-free nominal interest rate in our model.
In Figure 3 we plot impulse responses of selected variables under Greenspan’s policy
against the responses obtained under optimal policy in our model. As benchmark of
comparison, we also plot the impulse responses under two alternative policy rules: perfect
inﬂation targeting, i.e. πt =0 , and the classic Taylor Rule, i.e. the interest rate rule
(34) evaluated at ρr =0 , φπ =1 .5 and φx =0 .5. As Figure 3 illustrates, impulse
responses of output, consumption, investment, Tobin’s q, real risk-free rate and inﬂation
to a productivity shock under Greenspan’s policy are relatively close to optimal policy
14The rule (34) has been estimated with the method of instrumental variables suggested by Clarida et
al. (2000). Instruments are the four lags of inﬂation, output gap, M2 growth rate (FM2), commodity
price inﬂation (PSCCOM) and the spread between the long-term bond rate (FYGL) and the three-month
Treasury Bill rate (FYGM3).
21in our model, substantially closer than inﬂation targeting or the Taylor Rule. However,
our exercise also suggests that Greenspan was perhaps too accommodative with respect
to productivity shocks. For instance, output under Greenspan’s policy rises on impact by
about 25% more than it should when compared to the optimal policy in our model. In
contrast, output under strict inﬂation targeting or the Taylor Rule increases on impact
by only about 1/3 of what it should at optimal policy in our model.
Remember from previous discussion that strict inﬂation targeting would roughly ap-
proximate optimal policy response to a productivity shock in absence of any model un-
certainty, i.e. ψ =1 . Therefore, while Greenspan’s policy would seem too expansionary
from the perspective of a standard New-Keynesian model, it appears to be much closer
to optimal policy when evaluated from the perspective of our New-Keynesian model with
model uncertainty.
5F l e x i b l e i n ﬂation targeting and asset prices
In this section we study whether it is possible to implement optimal policy with simple
monetary policy rules. In the model with no doubts, when ψ =1 , there is a simple
solution. A policy of price stability, or zero inﬂation, would implement the optimal policy.
This is a standard result for New-Keynesian models with only productivity shocks. Given
this observation, we focus our attention to a class of ﬂexible inﬂation-targeting policies
which encompasses the strict inﬂation-targeting policy of zero inﬂation as a special case.15
In particular, we specialize to the following rules
ln(Pt/Pt−1)+ϕy ln(Yt/Yt−1)+ϕq ln(qt/qt−1)=0 , (35)
where ϕy and ϕq are parameters. In (35) we include a strict zero inﬂation target (the ﬁrst
term), a target for the growth of output (the second term), and a target for asset-price
changes in terms of Tobin’s q.
In the left panel of Figure 4, we set ϕq =0and explore how the optimal choice
of ϕy varies when ψ increases. The policy rule (35), for given parameter ϕy, together
with the structural equilibrium conditions can be solved to determine an equilibrium
allocation. Among the equilibria indexed by ϕy,t h eo p t i m a lc h o i c eo fϕy corresponds
to the equilibrium allocation that maximizes (32). Clearly, when ψ =1 ,w eo b t a i nt h a t
ϕy =0and therefore we get that a strict inﬂation targeting is optimal. When ψ increases,
15Interest-rate rules with reaction to inﬂation and other variables would be another class of policy
rules to consider. However, we ﬁnd this choice less appropriate since when ψ =1 , the optimal simple
interest-rate rule would require an inﬁnite reaction to the inﬂation rate.
22ϕy decreases monotonically. For instance, when ψ = 150, we obtain that ϕy = −0.22,
implying that a one percentage increase in output is accompanied by 22 basis points of a
positive inﬂation rate. This is not surprising since optimal policy in our model requires an
accommodative policy following productivity shocks, and therefore our ﬂexible-inﬂation
targeting policy requires positive comovements between output growth and inﬂation. A
similar picture emerges when we set ϕy =0and analyze the optimal choice of ϕq,t h e
response to asset-price movements. As the right panel of Figure 4 shows, policy should also
be accommodative in this direction and create positive comovements between inﬂation and
asset-price movements. We ﬁnd that ϕq should decrease as ψ rises. For instance, when
ψ = 150, we obtain that ϕq = −0.69, implying that a one percentage increase in asset
prices is accompanied by 69 basis points increase in CPI inﬂation.
Finally we investigate the more general form of inﬂation-targeting policy (35) in which
we allow for a simultaneous reaction to output-gap growth and asset prices. Figure 5
shows that the optimal combination of ϕq and ϕy is such that the optimal ϕy has a
similar pattern, although ampliﬁed, to the case in which we restrict ϕq to zero. However,
now, the optimal ϕq becomes positive for all values of ψ between 1 and 150. This is the
case because it is optimal to generate positive comovements between output growth and
inﬂation, and at the same time between output growth and asset-price changes.
To sum up, we ﬁnd that the optimal simple rule in our model should move from a strict
inﬂation-targeting policy, when there are no doubts, to a more ﬂexible inﬂation targeting
policy, which also includes output growth and asset-price inﬂation, when doubts rise.
However, similar to Bernanke and Gertler (2001), we also ﬁnd that including asset-price
inﬂation as target does not improve much average welfare, i.e. an inﬂation-targeting rule
employing only output would imply very similar allocations.
6 Special cases
In this section we report results obtained under two special cases: i) when only the price
setting decision is aﬀected by distorted beliefs; ii) when only the capital accumulation
decision is aﬀected by distorted beliefs. Notice that both these cases are hard to interpret
theoretically within the standard New-Keynesian framework as ﬁrms are owned by house-
holds, and should therefore maximize the expected discounted sum of proﬁts using the
same discount factor of households. Nevertheless, we think that reporting these results
may help to gain more intuition on the factors driving optimal policy in the benchmark
speciﬁcation. In addition, one may think of a diﬀerent model where ﬁrms are not dir-
ectly owned by households but, for instance, by entrepreneurs and have a theory on why
23these two classes of agents should have diﬀerent degrees of distortion in beliefs. While
interesting, such an extension is beyond the scope of this paper and left for future research.
6.1 The special case of no distortions in price-setting decision
Results about optimal policy are clearly driven by the interaction between the distortion
in the beliefs, the monopolistic distortion and the forward-looking pricing behavior of
ﬁrms under the Calvo’s model. To make this clear, we consider an environment in which
the stochastic discount factor through which ﬁrms evaluate future proﬁts is not distorted,
i.e. ˜ E in (25) coincides with E. Figure 6 plots the optimal policy responses of selected
variables following a permanent productivity shock under this assumption, everything else
being equal to the benchmark speciﬁcation. After a positive technology shock, monetary
policy becomes now less accommodating in our model. In particular output, consumption,
investment, inﬂation and Tobin’s q are lower than under the benchmark case of ψ =1and
in particular the Tobin’s q and inﬂation on impact decreases. In this way, monetary policy
reduces the pro-cyclicality of equity returns (causing counter-cyclical returns on equity
and capital for high enough ψ) and, therefore, reduces the equity premium to allow for
a relatively high level of physical capital accumulation.16 The real rate rises to sustain
a steadily increase in consumption. Since, under this experiment, beliefs of price setters
are not distorted, the monetary authority does not have the room to reduce the average
markup as in the previous case. Therefore, optimal policy in our model works to minimize
the distortions in the valuation of the return on capital. However, it is worth noticing
that, even in this case, the monetary policy implied by our model deviates in an important
way from a price-stability policy and the more the higher the degree of ambiguity.
6.2 The special case of no distortions in the capital accumula-
tion decision
Finally we derive optimal policy responses to a permanent productivity shock under the
assumption that the stochastic discount factor through which households evaluate future
returns on capital is not distorted, everything else being equal to the benchmark speciﬁc-
ation. Figure 7 plots the optimal policy responses of selected variables. Not surprisingly,
the responses of all variables to the productivity shock are qualitatively very similar to the
ones obtained under the benchmark speciﬁcation. However, for given parameter values,
16Notice that under the previous case of distortions in the beliefs of price-setters, the valuation of the
return on capital is distorted and the equity premium increases. However, average investment is pushed
up by the reduction in the average mark-up.
24responses at optimal policy are more procyclical than under the benchmark speciﬁcation.
In fact, absent the distortion in the capital accumulation decision, the monetary author-
ity can reduce the ineﬃciency due to the monopolistic distortion without causing more
ineﬃcient capital accumulation.
7C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we departed from the standard New-Keynesian monetary model by intro-
ducing doubts. In our model, households express distrust regarding the true probability
distribution. These doubts are reﬂected in asset prices and might generate, together with
ambiguity aversion, equity premia of similar size as those found in the data. This is
an important feature of our framework with respect to the benchmark model which, on
the contrary, is unable to match asset-price data. In this environment we study how a
policymaker, who instead trusts the model, would set optimal policy.
Results change in a substantial way with respect to the benchmark model. A standard
result in the literature is the optimality of a policy of price stability following productivity
shocks. In our model with doubts, we ﬁnd that policy should become more accommod-
ative with respect to productivity shocks and work to increase the equity premium. The
departure is larger, the higher is the degree of distrust that agents have. Most important,
in our model, ﬂexible-inﬂation targeting policy might include a reaction to asset-price
inﬂation in the direction to create positive comovements between inﬂation and asset-price
changes or between output growth and asset-price changes.
There are several limitations of our modeling strategy. First, we assume that house-
holds and ﬁrms share the same degree of doubts. Households’ doubts are reﬂected in
Arrow-Debreu prices and those are used to evaluate both asset prices and the future
proﬁts of the ﬁrms. We show that if doubts are just reﬂected in asset prices and do
not instead distort the evaluation of future ﬁrms’ proﬁts, then policy should be counter-
cyclical and in this case should work to reduce the equity premium. Second, we assume
that the only disturbance aﬀecting the economy is a productivity shock. Results would
not change if we were allowing for mark-up shocks modeled using a stationary process. In-
deed, doubts and ambiguity aversion are reﬂe c t e di nf e a r so fb a dn e w sr e g a r d i n gl o n g - r u n
consumption. Persistent productivity shocks, in contrast to transitory mark-up shocks,
c a ni n d e e dh a v ea ni n ﬂuence on long-run consumption. Third, we are conducting a pure
normative exercise under the assumption that the true probability distribution coincides
with the reference probability distribution distrusted by the agents. Results would change
when reference and true probability distributions do not coincide. Most interesting it is
25the case in which the policymaker also distrusts the reference probability distribution.
We leave these analyses for future work. Finally, we have abstracted from credit fric-
tions and asset-market segmentation which can be important features to add to properly
model asset prices and the transmission mechanism of shocks. This is also material for
future works. Here, we have kept the analysis the closest as possible to the benchmark
N e w - K e y n e s i a nm o d e lt os h o wh o was m a l ld e p a rture from that model delivers import-
ant diﬀerences in the policy conclusions and how this departure can rationalize a too
accommodative monetary policy as an optimal policy following productivity shocks.
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Figure 1: Impulse response of selected variables to a unitary permanent positive productiv-














































































































































































































Figure 2: Impulse response of selected variables to a unitary permanent positive productiv-






















































































































































































































































































Figure 3: Impulse response of selected variables to a unitary permanent positive productiv-
ity shock under optimal policy and under diﬀerent monetary policy rules for ψ =1 5 0 .






















Figure 4: Optimal inﬂation-targeting policies in the class (35) by varying the degree of
model uncertainty, ψ. Left panel: optimal ϕy when ϕq =0 . Right panel: optimal ϕq when
ϕy =0 .



























Figure 5: Optimal inﬂation-targeting policies in the class (35) by varying the degree of














































































































































































































































































































Figure 6: Impulse response of selected variables to a unitary permanent positive productiv-
ity shock under optimal policy for diﬀerent values of the degree of ambiguity aversion ψ
under the case in which only investment decisions are distorted.





































































Figure 7: Impulse response of selected variables to a unitary permanent positive productiv-
ity shock under optimal policy for diﬀerent values of the degree of ambiguity aversion ψ
under the case in which only price-setting decisions are distorted.
34